Introduction
Information technology is vital for all areas of business, administration and private life. Functioning and secure information technology is a cornerstone for today's business processes and communications. Secure IT comments are at the heart of reliable e-government and successful e-commerce.
Information technology is hence increasingly becoming the critical factor where failure or compromising can have serious consequences for IT users. Recent reports concerning the occurrence of new viruses, weaknesses, DoS attacks and other threats show that the exposure of IT systems has by no means declined. IT systems are also used in critical infrastructure areas which are vital for our societies to function. Protecting these components is a high-priority task.
A general statement
The federal government generally welcomes any measure designed to protect information technology. However, the design of any such measures must ensure that their constituent parts are in conformity with law. Data protection aspects require special consideration in this context. Furthermore, any measure supported must be capable of boosting confidence in information technology. This calls for a transparent information policy with a view to protection concepts and protection measures, along with the involvement of all kinds of interest groups when it comes to planning, designing, developing and marketing protective mechanisms. What's more, IT protection measures must not be misused to create barriers to market access.
The TCG and NGSCB security initiatives
The federal government generally appreciates that the manufacturers belonging to the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as well as Microsoft are determined to enhance the security of PC platforms via the TCG and NGSCB.
The TCG's security concept:
Security requirements:
1/8 1. Transparency and disclosure of interfaces and specifications 1.1. Algorithms used for encryption and signature functions must be sta ndardized, and must be considered as secure on a national and international level.
1.2. The key lengths used as well as the other parameters must at least be in conformity with the specifications laid down by the German Federal Office for Information Security with regard to secure encryption and secure signatures.
1.3. The trusted platform module (TPM) may not contain any functions which are not documented, in particular, no functions which can be used as a potential weakness or which enable any third party to access protected data in any other manner whatsoever.
1.4. The TCG should document the application scenarios in an easy-to understand manner which served as a basis for developing the specification for the TPM. This is the only promising way to illustrate the effects of the TPM in practical use and to identify the end applications concerned.
Certification of the security system
2.1. The security module (TPM) must be certified at least according to CC EAL4 medium. Certification must also include the physical and logical protection against attack on the security module (TPM).
2.2. It must be possible to check the security module (TPM) and independent institutions must be able to confirm its functionality. The development of suitable protection profiles is considered to be indispensable when it comes to establishing an internationally homogenous security standard. In order to ensure the unmistakable assignment of the function of the security module (TPM) and a clear checking capability, the security functions must be bundled centrally in a separate module (TPM). Mixing the security module with other function units (such as CPU, chip set, etc.) leads to a lack of transparency and makes security checks difficult.
3. System security, data backup and migration 3.1. It must be possible to transfer the information stored in an existing security module to a new hardware platform in such a manner that users can continue using their software even on the new hardware platform. It must be possible 2/8 to migrate any cryptographic keys of the TPM which are needed to use software, data and online services from one hardware platform to another.
Furthermore, the possibility of a defective TPM must also be taken into consideration, and a migration mechanism for data and/or keys needs to be implemented.
3.2. If DRM solutions are developed which are based on the security module (TPM), such solutions must consider the user's right to copy data and programs for private purposes and must be implemented accordingly.
3.3. If data that is not copyrighted is processed with the involvement of the security module (TPM), it must be possible to transfer such data for further use to other systems which do not include a security module.
3.4. The concept of the security module (TPM) must ensure that all major components are redundant in order to avoid single points of failure.
3.5. If keys (for example, endorsement keys) are used which -for security reasons -must definitely remain in the security module (TPM) and which cannot be exported, such keys must be generated in the TPM itself, or they must be generated by a process that warrants an equivalent degree of security. The secure generation of such keys must be confirmed by an independent institution.
System check by the user
4.1. Possibility to deactivate the security modules.
The user must be able to decide whether the new functions for enhancing security are to be used. This means that it must be possible to fully deactivate any security modules (TPMs) which are integrated into the hardware. In this context, a hardware solution (such as a switch or base for TPM) should also be implemented as an alternative to a software solution. Deactivation of the security module may not affect the functionality of any hardware and software components which do not use the functions of the new security architecture (TCG).
Security module deactivated as the default setting.
Additionally integrated security modules must by default be supplied in a deactivated condition. It must be left to the owner or user to activate any security modules.
4.3. Users must have full control of their keys, and they must be able to delete these keys when necessary and to generate new keys. The only keys to which users have no access are keys which are used to ensure the integrity 3/8 and authenticity of the TPM (for example, the endorsement key). Users must, however, be able to re-initialise any keys other than those which serve the unambiguous identification of the security module (such as the endorsement keys). It should be possible to delete any information previously stored in the TPM and to cancel its functionality (for example, when scrapping the PC).
4.4. Users must be able to control access to their keys, and reliable protection against unauthorized access to the keys must be possible. 4.5. If the security module (TPM) is permanently connected to the other hardware of the IT system (such as the PC), the functionality of the security module should be restricted to ensuring the security and integrity of the platform. The use of personalized programs, data and online services, if necessary, should be linked to a personalized smartcard rather than the security module (TPM).
This would enable more flexible user-related access to data and would significantly reduce migration problems. One requirement in this context is the implementation of functions for attestation identity (such as the AIKs) and the pertinent cryptographic keys in a mobile smart card.
4.6. The security module (TPM) may not hinder the use of the software by requiring certification by an external central institution which is outside the owner's or user's sphere of responsibility as a precondition for using the software.
Data protection
5.1. All data protection requirements must be fulfilled under any operating conditions of the security module. Data protection functions must, in particular, be so transparent that end users can at all times exercise their right of freedom of information and deactivate these functions.
It may not be possible to automatically activate functions relevant under data
protection law without the end user accepting this in each and every case. 10.6. The use of software subject to approval by a central certification authority is considered to be a problem. If certification is necessary, this should be carried out by an independent authority and at a reasonable fee. Non-commercial software should be exempt from any certification fees.
10.7.
The components development in conjunction with the implementation of the Microsoft security concept must also be open for other software developers. In this context, the development documentation must already be made available to the independent developers well in advance and on a timely basis as a measure to ensure that not just a single operating system will support the new security technologies.
11.Basic economic requirements:
7/8 11.
1.
An open and transparent information policy is in any case a vital precondition for creating the necessary trust among users in the fields of business, administration and policy.
11.2. Discrimination of hardware or software manufacturers by the terms and conditions of the NGSCB license must be avoided.
11.3.
Software which does not make use of the new NGSCB functions must be capable of continuing to work under the operating system which also supports the NGSCB.
11.4.
If the NGSCB is used for DRM (Digital Rights Management) purposes, preference must be given to any check in offline mode rather than to an online check.
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